Introduction
Interplanetary spacecraft are traditionally controlled by sequences of commands generated by a team of engineers. These sequences are uplinked to the spacecraft, which executes them in a more-or-less linear fashion. The commands that constitute a sequence range from very low-level commands (e.g. "Toggle power switch 27.") to relatively high-level commands such as "Turn the spacecraft to attitude A."
Sequence-based commanding has sucessfully met the challenge of controlling spacecraft many hundreds of millions of miles from Earth with extreme precision and often in the face of hardware failure. But the manual generation of sequences is difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. This is mainly because sequences are executed open-loop, so erroneous sequences can cause loss of data or, in extreme cases, loss of an entire mission. Thus, sequences must be constructed with exquisite care and painstakingly checked and re-checked for correctness before they are uplinked to the spacecraft. F u r t h e r m o r e , a n y u n e x p e c t e d h a r d w a r e f a i l u r e s o r e n v i r o n m e n t a l interactions during sequence execution will cause the state of the spacecraft to diverge from its expected state. This usually causes the spacecraft to abort the sequence and enter a safe mode, requiring additional time-consuming and expensive human intervention.
Efforts are currently underway at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) to design a control .system for a new generation of spacecraft that can operate with much less human intervention, and execute missions in unmodelled environments such as the surfaces of comets. These autonomous spacecraft are designed to accept very high level commands and execute them reliably even in the face of hardware failure, unexpected environmental interactions, and errors or inconsistencies in the command set.
To accomplish this requires radical rethinking of the entire spacecraft command process and control architecture. For example, some planning functions that are currently performed on the ground by humans must now be performed automatically by the spacecraft. Data representations and processes designed for humans in the loop must be redesigned to make them suitable for on-board operation.
In this article we explore the design of an executive for an autonomous spacecraft. The executive is responsible for translating high-level commands, whether they come from the ground or from an on-board planner, into the low-level commands understood directly by the spacecraft hardware. This requires a paradigm shift from an open-loop sequence-based executive to a closed-loop executive that is aware of and knows how to respond robustly to unexpected contingencies.
To understand the operation of a closed-loop autonomous spacecraft executive it is instructive to begin with a description of how traditional sequence-based commands work. This will illustrate some of the complex and subtle issues that an autonomous executive must face.
Spacecraft Commanding 101
To get a feel for some of the issues involved in generating and analyzing spacecraft command sequences, consider a very simple command: turning on the power for a deviceon a spacecraft, and so executed in a situation power bus to operate the c a t a s t r o p h i c .
Overloading a power
Electrical power is a heavily oversubscribed resource if one is not careful a power-on command can be where there is not enough power available on the device. The consequences of such a mistake can be bus causes the voltage on the bus to drop below the level at which-the *devices on the bus can operate reliably, a condition known as a "bus undervolt." On an unmanned spacecraft, this triggers emergency hardware interlocks that turn off the power to all but the most vital subsystems, an event known as a "bus trip." After a bus trip, the spacecraft goes into a mode of operation known as "safe mode" where it does nothing but try to establish contact with Earth. Getting the spacecraft out of safe mode requires manual intervention, which takes hours if not days. If a spacecraft enters safe mode just before a crucial science observation the opportunity for that observation is usually irretrivably lost.
If a spacecraft enters safe mode during a critical mission maneuver such as an orbit insertion the entire mission can be lost.
So even a simple thing like turning on a power switch is potentially catasrophic'.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that there is usually no way to measure the amount of power available on a spacecraft. Sequences are designed based on predictive models of available power, which is a complicated function of the spacecraft state, which in turn is a function of the sequence being executed. Thus, every command in a sequence can interact with every other command in the sequence. 
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Power Camera The code that implements the sequence command, "Turn on device X," implements something along the lines of:
Ask the bus controller to send a message to the PDU to change the state of the device X power switch to ON.
So an anomaly in turning on the power to a device could be caused by a problem in the device itself, or it could result from a problem in the PDU, the PDU's bus interface, the bus master, or the power source. It could also be caused by some other device on the spacecraft. For example, a bus client can fail in a way that causes it to inject noise on the bus and interfere with the operation of other bus clients. In fact, just about anything on the spacecraft can cause anomalous behavior anywhere else on the spacecraft. Unexpected effects can also be caused by spacecraft position or attitude, or interactions with external environmental phenomena like radiation.
An example of the kinds of interactions that can occur: on Cassini, firing the main engine can leave chemical deposits on the lens of the science camera, causing it to malfunction. To correct this problem, the camera is equipped with a little windshield wiper to clean the lens. When this wiper is operating, the effects of the reaction torque can be measured in the spacecraft's overall attitude.
Procedural and Declarative Knowledge Representations
By the time a command like "Turn on device X" is incorporated into a sequence a tremendous amount of knowledge has been brought to bear, including knowledge of mission goals, the design of the spacecraft, physics, and common sense. This knowledge is all "compiled away" in the final sequence. There is no way to extract from a sequence the reasoning that led to its construction, or the constraints that it was designed to obey.
For example, consider the simple sequence, "Turn on the camera, then take a picture." We humans know that the order in which these steps are performed is important because we know that electronic devices like cameras need power in order to function. We apply this knowledge so effortlessly that we are usually not even aware of it. To appreciate the situation from the point of view of a computer, consider the following excerpt from an actual sequence for the Galileo spacecraft, currently in orbit around Jupiter: has no basis for making any choices about their execution. The spacecraft has no basis for determining whether, for example, the 15 second delay between command 35A and 35DML is really necessary, if it can be longer or shorter, if the order of these two commands could be reversed, and if either of them puts the spacecraft at risk for a bus trip or other catastrophe. All the information needed to make such decisions has been "compiled away" in the process of generating the sequence, so all the spacecraft can do is blindly follow its dictates, and call home if the slightest thing goes wrong.
If we want our spacecraft to exhibit less brittle behavior, then the knowledge that currently gets compiled away during sequence generation must be somehow provided to the spacecraft. One approach is to build an explicit d e c l a r a f i v e model of the spacecraft and use various Artificial Intelligence (AI) search and deduction tecnniques to make operational decisions. Unfortunately, the models needed to support such an approach tend to be very large and difficult to maintain. For example, to figure out from declarative knowledge even as simple a thing as how much timing flexibility exists in the above sequence the spacecraft needs to know what the 35A command does (it turns on the magnetometer), what the 35DML command does (it loads the magenetometer's firmware -DML stands for direct memory load), how much power the magnetometer uses, how long it takes after the magnetometer is turned on before it is ready to accept commands, when the magnetometer is actually needed, how much heat the magnetometer generates, etc. etc. Things get immensely more complicated for commands to, say, turn the spacecraft or fire the main engine.
An alternative to generating a declarative model of the spacecraft (and associated computational machinery) is to incrementally expand the existing p r o c e d u r a l vocabulary of sequences to include explicit represenations of, say, execution time flexibility. For example, consider the following command " s e q u e n c e " :
Step 1: Do command 35A between times T1 and T2.
Step 2: Do command 35DML no less than 15 seconds after step 1.
It is not possible to give these instructions in a traditional command sequence, where every step must be associated with a particular fixed execution time. With a simple extension to the sequence vocabulary and the underlying execution machinery we have 'given the spacecraft the ability to display some flexibility in execution without the need to generate a complete declarative model.
We can envision additional increments to the expressiveness of our command language. For example, we might want to protect against the possibility of a bus trip by saying, "Before executing command 35A wait until the system power margin is at least five watts." Here we have extended the vocabulary to to allow the system to wait for a particular condition to become true before taking an action. This naturally leads to a host of other extensions: timeouts, descriptions of corrective action if timeouts expire, etc.
These extensions to the sequencing vocabulary provide the ability to express spacecraft instructions that are not nearly as brittle as traditional sequences. Because they are backwards-compatible extensions to the traditional sequencing paradigm, procedural representations tend to be easier to use than their declarative counterparts, which require a more radical shift in how one thinks about spacecraft commanding.
Also, the computational machinery needed to execute procedural representations tends to be relatively simple and efficient. F o r t u n a t e l y , t h e d e c l a r a t i v e a n d p r o c e d u r a l a p p r o a c h e s a r e complementary rather than antagonistic. We have developed a system for executing robust procedures that can serve both as a spacecraft sequencing system, and as an integrating component for a hybrid autonomous control a r c h i t e c t u r e t h a t c o m b i n e s p r o c e d u r a l a n d ( m u l t i p l e ) d e c l a r a t i v e representations. This hybrid architecture, of which our executive is a part, is described in the next section. The executive itself is described in more detail in section 5.
Remote Agent Architecture
We RA interacts with the spacecraft through a real-time control system (RT), which directly controls the spacecraft hardware. RT consists of a set of control and monitoring tasks which provide the core functionality for the RA. RT functionality ranges from relatively simple device drivers that provide direct access to spacecraft hardware, to complex control loops for controlling the spacecraft's attitude and trajectory. Information about the status of RT control loops and hardware sensors is passed back to RA either directly or through a set of m o n i t o r s . The PS component of RA also interacts with a set of planning experts, which are subroutines for computing answers to domainspecific queries like how much time it will take to turn from one attitude to a n o t h e r .
EXEC is the core of the architecture. It coordinates all the activities in both RA and in the external software components. EXEC provides both an extended procedural vocabulary for expressing instructions, and an integrated declarative knowledge base. EXEC itself has very limited deduction capabilities, relying instead on MM, PS and MIR to perform most of the model-based r e a s o n i n g . PS and MIR are both model-based, and each has its own modelling language. The PS modelling language (which is also used for MM) has facilities for describing the interactions of spacecraft activities evolving in time, and allows one to describe constraints among acitivities (like turns) and states (like hardware configurations). The language also has vocabulary for talking about time which is used to describe how long different activites are expected to take.
PS uses this information to generate plans of action in terms of activities bound to temporal intervals whose endpoints are not fixed in time, but simply constrained relative to one another. The resulting plans are thus both concurrent and flexible, that is, they describe activities that go on in parallel, and without specifying precisely when those activities are to take p l a c e .
The MIR modelling language has facilities for describing the finite-state behavior of the spacecraft hardware. For example, using the MIR modelling language one can express the fact that if the power switch for a device is closed, and enough power is available, that the corresponding device should be on. The MIR models are used in two ways, for fault diagnosis (mode identification or MI) and fault recovery (mode recovery or MR). Using its models, MIR is able to deduce the most likely actual state of the spacecraft hardware given the observable state, i.e. sensor readings, taking into account that the sensors themselves might be faulty. MIR can also use the same models to derive sequences of actions that will produce a desired configuration of the hardware. These capabilities are used to provide EXEC with an abstracted view of the spacecraft state, and a mechanism for recovering from faults.
RA is written entirely in Common Lisp. It runs both in Allegro Common Lisp under Unix, and on the flight processor (a Rad6000 -a radiation-hardened processor similar to a PowerPC) under a custom port of Harlequin Common Lisp for the vxWorks real-time operating system.
Remote Agent Executive
The Remote Agent Executive coordinates the activities of all the other components of the spacecraft software. EXEC consists of a core language which provides an expressive vocabulary for procedural knowledge, and a set of higher-level facilities built on top of this core, including flexible plan execution, configuration management, and resource management. Each of these facilities is described in turn in the following subsections.
ESL
The core of EXEC is a lanaguage called ESL (Execution Support Language) [Gat961 which provides a rich representation for the sort of procedural knowledge alluded to in section 3 above. ESL consists of about half a dozen loosely coupled feature sets that provide facilities for handling unexpected contingencies, achieving goals, managing and coordinating parallel tasks, and managing resources. In addition, ESL provides a backchaining logical database, essentially a little Prolog interpreter, which is the central mechanism through which the procedural and declarative paradigms interact.
Flexible Plan Execution
EXEC provides a facility for executing the plans produced by PS, which are not linear sequences of commands, but rather abstract descriptions of parallel activities. A PS plan consists of a set of timelines. Each timeline corresponds to a description of some aspect of the spacecraft's state at varying levels of abstraction. For example, a timeline may describe a simple state like whether a device is on or off, or a more complex abstract state like whether or not the spacecraft is turning, and what its target attitude is.
Each timeline is subdivided into a set of temporal intervals over which the timeline's state description is constant. These intervals are referred to as t o k e n s .
For example, the timeline for the power state of a device usually consists of a sequence of tokens alternating between o n and off. The timeline for the spacecraft attitude will alternate between t u r n i n g and c o n s t a n tattitude tokens.
The beginning and ending times of the tokens are in general not specified in terms of absolute time, but rather in relation to the start and end times of other tokens. This allows an explicit representation of the dependencies among tokens, and enables considerable robustness and flexibility. For example, consider the example from section 3, where the magnetometer had to be turned on fifteen seconds before loading its software. This dependency can be represented in a PS plan by two tokens, one on the magnetometer's power state timeline which states that the power is on, and another on the magnetomer's activity timeline which states that the software is being loaded. The temporal constraint is represented by a plan annotation that says that the start of the first token must come at least fifteen seconds before the start of the second token.
As one might imagine, executing a plan specified using this notation is considerably more challenging than executing a simple linear sequence of commands. But it generates behavior that is far more flexible and reliable because the executive now has explicit information about the dependencies between steps. If turning on the magnetometer fails, EXEC is free to take some corrective action as long as the software-loading activity doesn't start for at least fifteen seconds after the power is successfully turned on, and all the other temporal constraints specified in the plan are met.
EXEC's plan execution system (called the plan runner) is built on top of ESL's task management facilities. Each plan timeline has a thread of execution associated with it. Each thread issues commands to control those aspects of the spacecraft state corresponding to its timeline. The threads use ESL's synchronization facilities to coordinate their actions to conform to the temporal constraints specified in the plan. The result is a system that is far more robust than a traditional sequence-based executive.
Resource Management
Scarce resources are a fact of life on spacecraft. On-board processes contend for a limited number of devices. Shared resources, such as energy and data storage, are subject to hard (and relatively severe) limits, as well as environmental influences (such as solar exposure for battery charging) that change these limits over time.
Resource management in RA is done mainly by PS, which typically uses worst-case estimates of resource utilization. However, the uncertainty in the environment and its effect on the true resource utilization can make the PS resource usage estimates inaccurate. The problem is particularly severe on p l a n e t a r y r o v e r s , w h i c h m u s t c o n t e n d w i t h h u g e e n v i r o n m e n t a l u n c e r t a i n t i e s .
EXEC provides a general architecture for managing resources at run-time, providing a layer of protection against inaccurate predictions by PS, and also a measure of safety for manually generated procedures. EXEC's resource manager (RM) architecture consists of a managing object for each resource. When a task wants to take an action that affects the state of a resource it registers its intent to do so with the resource manager object. The manager object checks all the intentions pertaining to a particular resource and finds a mutually consistent set. Those tasks making the mutually consistent requests are allowed to proceed; all other requests are blocked until enough tasks in the first set release their requests to allow a new mutually consistent set to p r o c e e d .
This general architecture is currently implemented only for discrete-state resources like hardware configurations. The manager object for a discrete state resource is called a p r o p e r t y lock. Property locks and the facilities for accessing them are currently built in to ESL.
The property lock mechanism is quite powerful. It automatically manages not only the synchronization of multiple tasks accessing a particular resource, but also the actual achievement, maintenance and (if needed) restoration of the physical state corresponding to that resource. However, it also lacks some important functionality. It does not take into account process priorities. (This is a very complicated problem; see section 6.) It does not currently perform deadlock detection, although this could be added without difficulty. And, as mentioned before, the property lock mechanism is limited to managing discrete states.
Configuration Management
PS plans describe the evolution of the spacecraft state usually at a high level of abstraction, leaving it up to EXEC to fill in the details at run time. For example, the plan may specify that a particular capability is needed for a particular activity, but it might not say anything at all about the actual hardware configuration required to provide that capability. It is the responsibility of EXEC to manage the actual configuration of the spacecraft to make it conform to the constraints imposed by the plan. This is challenging for several reasons. First, spacecraft are quite complicated, with many tightly coupled interacting components.
(As discussed in section 2, even as simple an action as turning on a device can be quite complicated.) The best configuration for a particular goal is often a function of the current configuration. Second, the design of the spacecraft can change during the software development process. Third, the spacecraft is expected to continue to operate even if some of its components fail in flight.
EXEC provides a generic configuration management facility (CM) which uses a simple model of the spacecraft hardware topology to automatically generate the right sequence of commands to control the spacecraft configuration. The model is described in terms of a class hierarchy and a connectivity diagram.
A generic library of configuration management routines uses the model to control the hardware.
A typical model includes descriptions of all the devices, their types, and their data and power connections. CM uses this information to respond to requests to provide devices of a particular class. For example, if a request is made to provide a camera, CM will go through the list of available cameras, select one, and configure it.
This typically involves considerations of hardware states other than just the camera. For example, turning on a camera usually involves sending a command to a power switching unit, not the c a m e r a .
Besides configuring the hardware to provide requested functionality, CM also coordinates configuration requests from multiple parallel tasks at runtime using ESL's property lock mechanism. This provides an additional measure of safety against flaws in the PS plan. (PS plans are guaranteed to be correct with respect to the PS models, but the models can have errors with respect to the actual situation on the spacecraft.)
CM makes hardware configuration management code much easier to write and maintain than hand-crafted code.
If the spacecraft configuration changes, only the hardware model needs to be changed. Commanding a particular configuration usually involves only one line of code.
For example, the following code is an excerpt from the DS1 CM model.
(define-device-class :camera :power-function fsc-power-request :talk-function camera-talk-msg) (define-device :camera-A :camera :powered-thru :powerbus-1 :switched-thru :fsc-camera-switch1 :ready-state ((:health-state :ok) (:power-state : o n ) ) ) Based on the above model, configuring and using a camera requires only a tiny snippet of code:
(with-selected-device :camera ( t a k e -p i c t u r e s ) )
This code would select a camera, make it ready by taking actions to make it powered on and healthy, and then take pictures. Until the picture-taking is complete, any task that tries to change the state of the camera away from its ready state will be prevented from running. Furthermore, if the camera deviates from its ready state during picture taking then two things will happen. First, the picture-taking task will be notified that the camera is no longer ready and given an opportunity to either 1) take corrective action or 2) wait for an automatic recovery (generated by MIR). All this complexity is completely hidden from the programmer behind the abstractions of highlevel control constructs like WITH-SELECTED-DEVICE. More information on how contingencies are handled can be found in [Gat97].
Related Work
There are many robust execution systems in the literature. 
Summary and Future Work
Traditional spacecraft commanding requires ground operators to generate detailed and inflexible command sequences. These sequences are difficult and expensive to generate, and do not contain enough information to allow the spacecraft to respond intelligently to deviations from expected behavior, which makes them inherently brittle.
At the core of a new control architecture (the Remote Agent) designed to make spacecraft more self-reliant and less dependent on ground intervention is an executive (EXEC) which implements an expanded vocabulary for commanding spacecraft. EXEC provides a wide range of capabilities at different levels of abstraction, ranging from simple failure recovery mechanisms, to the execution of high-level flexible plans and the ability to c o m m a n d t h e s p a c e c r a f t d i r e c t l y i n t e r m s o f a b s t r a c t h a r d w a r e configurations. EXEC's design is highly modular, making it able to integrate a wide variety of external facilities. In the RA architecture, EXEC integrates a planner and scheduler (PS), a discrete-state reasoning system (MIR), and realtime control software (RT).
EXEC's flexibility gives it much of its power, but it is also a source of certain weaknesses. Because there are few architectural requirements levied on the modules that EXEC connects, the result can be a mishmash of different conflicting representations. RA uses three different representation languages. It represents redundant information in all three, which can cause serious software configuration control problems.
EXEC's resource management capabilties are also somewhat impoverished at the moment. It can only manage discrete-state resources, it does not take task priority into account when making resource decisions, and it does not have a mechanism for detecting and recovering from deadlocks. However, the general architecture was designed to allow all these capabilities to be added without major difficulty.
In the future we hope to develop an autonomy system that uses a more uniform and non-redundant representation among its different components. We also intend to remedy the three shortcomings of the resource manager listed above. Taking task priorities into account presents a unique problem. In general, high-priority tasks should be allowed to usurp resources from lowpriority tasks. However, this leads to very difficult problems in trying to insure the consistency of the dynamic state of the usurped task. This is because, in general, a task may have associated with it a number of c l e a n u p p r o c e d u r e s that must be executed before the task can be safely aborted. But these cleanup procedures can, in general, take arbitrarily long to execute. In general, this problem devolves to the full planning problem. The challenge will be to find a heuristic that handles a useful subset of the general case.
